Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

  • Authors

    • Ruffin-Benoit Ngoie Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Mbanza-Ngungu (Teaching College of Mbanza-Ngungu)
    • Berthold Ulungu E-L Institut Supérieur des Techniques Appliquées
    2015-02-20
    https://doi.org/10.14419/ijamr.v4i1.4139
  • Aggregation, Approval Voting, Borda Majority Count, Majority Judgment, Social Choice Function.

  • Abstract

    This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system.

  • References

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  • How to Cite

    Ngoie, R.-B., & Ulungu E-L, B. (2015). Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory. International Journal of Applied Mathematical Research, 4(1), 177-182. https://doi.org/10.14419/ijamr.v4i1.4139

    Received date: 2015-01-08

    Accepted date: 2015-02-02

    Published date: 2015-02-20