Scalable dynamic key management for location based services

 
 
 
  • Abstract
  • Keywords
  • References
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  • Abstract


    A Scalable key  management for  enforcing spatial-quality access control on public broadcast services. This authorization  model  is  used  to  construct  Authorization  keys using efficient, secure and scalable Hierarchical key. Secure media broadcast over Internet poses unique security challenges.   One   important   problem   for   public   broadcast location- services (LBS) is to enforce access control on a large number of subscribers. This is achieved by providing an authorization model in constructing authorization keys using efficient, secure and scalable Hierarchical key graphs. And minimizes number of keys that needs to be distributed is thus scalable to a large number of subscribers and the dimensionality of the authorization model. In an offline basis the map viewer is loaded with collection of tiles or segments.  The entire map is not loaded fully. If  the user key and the segment key is matched with each other then the requested regions are loaded and displayed. Otherwise is blocked for the unauthorized user.


  • Keywords


    : Access Control, Key Management, Location-Based Services (LBS), Scalability and Performance

  • References


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Article ID: 8981
 
DOI: 10.14419/ijet.v7i1.3.8981




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